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Pleasure in Virtue: The
Possibility of Willful Virtuous
Behavior
Kaleb TerBush
Abstract
Virtuous behavior has often been construed as having three requisite elements: right
action, done for the right reason, and also carried out with the “right feeling,” i.e.
without the contrary inclination of Aristotle’s merely continent individual. Some
have argued that even if the right motivating reason(s) for action might not be
directly within our power to act on at will, there are a number of steps we can take
in order to make ourselves more responsive to the appropriate reasons – thus giving
us indirect control over which reasons we take to be compelling. However, I believe
that such accounts emphasize the importance of right action done for the right
reason at the expense of giving a complete account of right feeling – and are thus
incomplete pictures of both virtuous behavior and the way in which it is, to a degree,
within our control, rather than solely a matter of moral luck. In this paper, I
elaborate on these views, arguing that if we can control our reasons-responsiveness,
it follows that we can likewise influence our sensitivity to what we have reason to
desire. If we can make ourselves responsive to the best reasons in support of what
we ought to desire, then in doing the right action for the right reason we will
presumably satisfy a desire of ours, and thus we will take pleasure in acting
virtuously, without a contrary inclination to do otherwise. And, I think this is true
regardless of the outcome of debates surrounding the nature of both motivation and
desires. In this way, then, I argue that the necessary components for virtuous
behavior – doing the right action, for the right reason, and especially with the right
feeling – are truly “up to us” in large part, and not merely to chance.
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1. Moral Luck and the Possibility of Virtuous Behavior
Discussing moral luck, Thomas Nagel says that:
A person may be greedy, envious, cowardly, cold, ungenerous, unkind, vain, or
conceited, but behave perfectly by a monumental effort of will. To possess these
vices is to be unable to help having certain feelings under certain circumstances…
people are morally condemned for such qualities, and esteemed for others equally
beyond control of the will: they are assessed for what they are like.
To Kant this seems incoherent because virtue is enjoined on everyone and
therefore must in principle be possible for everyone. It may be easier for some than
for others, but it must be possible to achieve it by making the right choices, against
whatever temperamental background. One may want to have a generous spirit, or
regret not having one, but it makes no sense to condemn oneself or anyone else for
a quality which is not within the control of the will. 1
He goes on to point out that Kant’s view “rules out moral judgement of many of the virtues
and vices,” as these are ostensibly out of our control. However, Nagel believes that such a
conclusion is “intuitively unacceptable”; even if one becomes convinced that it is
unjustifiable to judge agents based on virtues and vices supposedly not within their power
to influence, such evaluative sentiments “reappear involuntarily as soon as the argument is
over.”
Two things become immediately clear from this discussion. The first is that, as I
believe Nagel rightly points out, we have a natural tendency to praise individuals with
certain character traits, dispositions, inclinations, and so on, and to blame those with others.
The second is that it seems to be of the utmost importance, morally-speaking, whether or
not these characteristics are in any way within our ability to control. Both Nagel and Kant
seem to believe that they are not, due to certain apparent facts about the nature of both
moral luck and our moral psychologies; therefore, they think that we must look elsewhere
than virtue and vice when assigning moral blame or praise.
On this picture, then, those who possess unvirtuous dispositions, feelings, and
attitudes – or, vices – are stuck with them, so to speak, and are thus routinely subject to our
(un)reflective moral blame. While they might be able to overcome said dispositions via a
“monumental effort of the will” and still act in conformity with what the virtuous individual
would do, and perhaps even do so for the right reason(s), they still do so in the face of a
contrary inclination to act otherwise. Per traditional conceptions of virtue, this ultimately
prohibits them from being considered fully virtuous. Instead, this person is akin to
Aristotle’s continent individual, whose “rational principle… urges them aright and towards
the best objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed… which
fights against and resists that principle.” 2 So, the merely continent – and not virtuous –

1

Nagel, Thomas. “Moral Luck.” Mortal Questions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Print. 32-33.
2
Aristotle. Nichomacean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross, Batoche Books, 1999. Print. 19.
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person “acts with choice, but not with appetite”; 3 they deliberately choose to act in the right
way for the right reason but fail to actually desire or take pleasure in doing so, instead
possessing a contrary inclination to act other than the way that they actually are. Thus, they
lack the right feeling 4 generally considered necessary for virtuous behavior.
So, we can formulate three necessary conditions for fully virtuous behavior: (1)
doing the right action (2) for the right reason(s) and (3) with the right feeling, i.e. desiring
to act as such, taking pleasure in doing so, and/or without having a contrary inclination to
act otherwise.
At this point I have given a general definition for virtuous action, one that has three
requisite components. It seems plausible to assume, as I will for the rest of this essay, that
merely choosing and doing the right action (the one consistent with what virtue requires,
or what the virtuous individual would do) is something that is directly within our power.
In that sense, we have the ability, and thus presumably the moral responsibility, to at the
very least perform virtuous action(s) 5 – fulfilling the first necessary condition for virtuous
behavior.
But of course, the right action can still be done for the wrong reason. Following
that, the extent of our abilities is less obvious when it comes to the second necessary
condition for virtuous behavior – acting on, from, or for the right reason(s), meaning those
reasons that are appropriate to and consistent with virtue, virtuous behavior, and/or what
the virtuous individual would do. Consider an example: we ought to help a friend in need
because we know that beneficence is a virtue (the right, appropriate, or virtuous reason),
and not because doing so might mean that said friend will owe us a favor in the future (the
wrong, inappropriate, or unvirtuous reason). Aristotle seems to assume that we are capable
of controlling our reasons for action, or what reasons we ultimately take to be motivating
and choose to act on. 6 This is exhibited in his discussion of the continent individual, who
acts rightly merely on the basis of having adequately exercised their “rational principle.”
As Robert Audi 7 has argued, however, it is far from clear that we are actually able to do
this in such a direct way, as Aristotle assumes. I will turn to this potentially troubling
possibility, as well as Audi’s discussion of it, in the next section.
Finally, what about satisfying the third and last necessary condition for virtuous
behavior – acting with the right feeling, as I have been putting it? Aristotle seems to believe
3

Id. at 37.
I will refer to the complex set of dispositions, inclinations, attitudes, and affective states that
characterize what Aristotle takes to be constitutive of the virtuous individual simply as possessing
the right “feeling.” I do so for simplicity’s sake – admittedly, though, potentially missing some of
the possible complexities involved.
5
Of course, there are often external constraints on our ability to act in a certain way, including and
especially in the way that morality mandates. Keeping in mind the “ought-implies-can” principle, I
will merely be considering cases where there are no such constraints on our ability to act virtuously.
I will also not be addressing the normative issue of what sort of actions virtue enjoins in this essay.
6
This is in direct conflict with the Humean view of the relationship between desire, reason, and
motivation. On such a view, the only real reasons to act are dependent in some way upon the desires
of the agent. I return to this debate later on.
7
Audi, Robert. “Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action.” Philosophical Issues, vol. 19, no. 1, 2009,
pp. 1-20.
4
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that adequate reasoning (i.e. seeing what the right reason to act is) and habituation (i.e.
acting rightly for the right reason consistently and routinely) is sufficient for one to
eventually take pleasure in acting virtuously, without the contrary inclination or desire that
would make them merely continent. If what Nagel says is true, however, this right feeling
requisite for truly virtuous behavior is in fact not directly within our power to regulate due
to facts about our moral psychologies and/or moral luck that are seemingly beyond our
control. This would put willfully being virtuous out of our reach. And, this would be true
no matter how much effort we expend and even if we do the right action(s) for the right
reason(s). I will return to this worry towards the end of my paper.
2. Reasons-Responsiveness: Influencing Our Sensitivity to Reasons for Action
Assuming that the capacity to act in some way that we have chosen – namely, to
do the action consistent with what the virtuous person would do – is within our power, we
have satisfied the first necessary condition for virtuous behavior. Let us now turn to the
second condition, which requires that one acts for, on, or is ultimately motivated by the
right reason(s). On the one hand, philosophers since Aristotle have presupposed that in
some sense we have the ability to willfully determine what reason(s) to act on. Robert Audi,
however, has argued that we in fact do not have the ability to exert such direct control over
our reasons for action – and if that “disturbing… even paradoxical” conclusion is true, then
virtue is not completely “up to us,” as commonly presupposed.
Instead, Audi believes that we actually have indirect control over our reasons for
action. This is because we are able to influence, via a number of means, our responsiveness
to reasons, including and especially the ones that are consistent with virtue. I will return to
Audi’s argument explaining why he thinks this but will first draw out the problem a bit
further.
Audi uses a number of examples to highlight the disparity that can, and often does,
arise between what we see as either good or bad reason(s) to act, and which reason(s) we
are actually inclined, compelled, and ultimately motivated to act upon. He characterizes
this relationship as follows:
Suppose, for instance, that I am inclined to A [where A is a virtuous action] for a
bad reason [i.e. one not in line with virtue] but have a good reason [i.e. one in line
with virtue] to A. If I can bring it about at will [my emphasis] that either (1) I
believe I should A for the good reason or (2) I want (strongly enough) to A for a
good reason, I can thereby causing [sic] acting virtuously, i.e. A-for-r, where r is a
good reason to A and of a kind appropriate to some virtue. This would mean we
could sometimes act virtuously, and perhaps contribute to becoming virtuous or to
strengthening our virtuous character if we already have it, just by a kind of mental
exertion: what some would call a volition. 8
In other words, he takes this to be a technical characterization of the sort of capacity
presupposed in virtue theory since Aristotle: if we adequately understand that some reason
8

Id. at 15.
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is the one consistent with virtue and thus the one that we ought to act on, then by some
internal process we can will ourselves, as it were, to actually take said reason to be the
overridingly motivating one by acting on it. If such a process is possible, he believes, then
it must be formulated as such. Audi concludes, though, that so characterized “[i]t is
doubtful that we have the kind of direct voluntary power just illustrated.” 9 As he points
out, the truth of this apparent fact about our moral psychologies worryingly entails that
being completely virtuous is not attainable solely by some amount of mental effort. Instead,
the ability to actually take the good reasons to be motivating is merely a matter of our
happening to have the correct sorts of temperaments, personalities, dispositions, and
inclinations – in other words, the things constitutive of virtuous character. Audi does
believe that this claim about our (in)ability to “harness” or “unharness” certain reasons
voluntarily is true. But he also believes that “how virtuous our actions are… can be very
largely up to us.” 10 How can he possibly hold both of these views?
Audi thinks that instead of having direct control over our reasons for action, we
actually have indirect control over them, via our ability to influence which reasons we are
sensitive to. He believes that this is possible because he considers our understanding of our
reasons for action to be beliefs about the grounds supporting doing the action in question.
Likewise, this entails that influencing our reasons for action involves influencing our
beliefs about the “grounds supporting the action… [t]his is because what we believe,
especially in normative matters, tends (if we are rational) to affect our actions, and is (other
things equal) more likely to do so if vividly in consciousness.” Simply put, Audi takes our
perception of the motivating strength of a reason for action to be belief(s) about the strength
of the grounds that support performing the action. So, while we might not be able to directly
control our reasons for action in the same way that we cannot simply will ourselves to
believe something, it certainly is the case that we can influence our beliefs by making
ourselves more responsive to certain justificatory reasons. In the same vein, then, Audi
believes that we can influence which reasons for action we take to be motivating by making
ourselves more responsive to the reasons supporting having some belief about the grounds
supporting doing some action – namely, those good reasons that are consistent with those
that the virtuous individual would act on.
Because Audi takes our reasons for action to be beliefs about the grounds we have
for acting in some way, he also thinks that the methods we use for regulating our beliefs
are also capable of allowing us to influence our reasons for action. If he is right in this, then
it seems within our ability to make ourselves more amenable to certain reasons for action,
ideally making the good reasons for action more forceful and thus overwhelmingly
motivating to us. And crucially, our ability to indirectly control our reasons for action via
directly influencing our reasons-responsiveness would put virtue back within our reach.
This is, again, because virtue requires that we act from, for, or on the right reason(s) –
something which does now appear to be within our power. For Audi, we merely have to
fulfill the five “domains of moral responsibility” that he lays out, which are really just
methods of regulating belief-formation.

9

Id.
Id. at 17-18.
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The five domains, per Audi, are as follows. 11 The first is the seeking of relevant
reasons and counter-reasons for action that are “relevant to whatever matter is at hand,” as
doing so “can give wider scope to nature in regulating conduct and richer content to our
discourse in explaining or justifying our actions.” The second is the seeking of reflective
equilibrium, or consistency amongst our set(s) of beliefs. The third is the clear and
deliberate identification of, emphasis on, and assessment of reasons; in this way, we can
better understand what beliefs and thus reasons for action we actually have and/or ought to
have. The fourth is interpersonal comparison of reasons for action so that we can share
evidence, erase bias, and ultimately have stronger agreement and communication about the
grounds supporting acting in some way. The fifth and last is both recognizing and removing
“a degree of motivation disproportional to the [actual] normative strength of our grounds.”
This is akin to seeing that one holds a belief with “unjustified confidence,” then
understanding that one ought to not do so.
I hope the point of this discussion is clear. Recall that the second necessary
condition for virtuous action requires that it be done for the right reason. Audi argues that
while we have good reason to think that we do not have direct control over our reasons for
actions, we luckily seem to be capable of influencing which reasons we find compelling.
So, although we cannot directly, willfully, and deliberately (un)harness the (in)appropriate
reasons – those that are (in)consistent with virtue – we can, instead, epistemically conduct
ourselves in such a way as to make ourselves more responsive and sensitive to, and thus
more likely to be motivated by, the reasons consistent with virtuous behavior. If what Audi
has said thus far is correct – which I take it to be and will assume it is for the rest of this
essay – getting ourselves to be motivated by the right reasons is, albeit indirectly,
something that we are capable of deliberately doing.
3. Taking Pleasure in Virtuous Action
Thus far, I take myself to have given a definition of virtuous behavior that lays out
its three constitutive components. I also hope to have, invoking Audi’s research, shown
that at this point two out of those three elements are, more or less, within our ability to
ensure: namely, that both right action and acting for the right reason(s) are “up to us,” rather
than relegated to the domain of Nagel’s moral luck. So far, then, this at least partially
preserves the possibility of willful virtuous behavior as traditionally characterized.
Yet, Audi peculiarly fails to explicitly mention anything regarding how one feels
when doing the right action for the right reason. But as previously discussed, this is often
considered the third and last necessary condition for virtue.
Let me get clearer about how I believe Audi conceives of virtuous behavior.
Admittedly, he never explicitly defines his conception and only does so “implicitly.” 12 In
his own words, “acting virtuously… is acting on the basis of motivation [sic] and beliefs
whose content has a sufficiently close relation to the elements essential in the trait
constituting the virtue in question.” In other words, Audi thinks that virtuous behavior is
only virtuous insofar as it is rooted in virtuous character. In this way, it looks as if he is
11
12

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 5.
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positing another necessary condition essential to virtuous behavior: that the agent also
possesses the virtue qua specific character trait, quality, disposition, inclination, etc.
relevant to the situation, action, and reason(s) at hand.
However, when requiring that an agent have the relevant virtue necessary for the
behavior to be considered virtuous, I believe that Audi likely has something in mind akin
to my conception of right feeling. I think this interpretation of Audi’s view is plausible
because it seems fair to assume that if an agent has a temperamental propensity to act in a
certain manner, then they will by definition not have a contrary inclination against acting
in the way consistent with said disposition. If the disposition is a virtuous one, it follows
that they will also not have a contrary inclination to act unvirtuously and will thus act
without the desire to do otherwise, making their behavior fully virtuous. So rather than
stipulating a fourth necessary condition, I take Audi to actually be offering a different
formulation of the third necessary condition for virtuous behavior that I have been
discussing throughout this paper – namely, that the right action done for the right reason
be performed with the right feeling.
Returning to the possibility of virtuous behavior, then, if my interpretation of Audi
is correct, the question now becomes: are our dispositions within our control in a way such
that we can willfully influence ourselves so as to not have a contrary inclination against
acting in a way consistent with virtue? Are we able to cultivate within ourselves, despite
whatever we have or have not been granted by the deliverances of moral luck, the capacity
to desire to act virtuously and to thus take pleasure in doing so? While the first version of
the question emphasizes merely not having a contrary inclination and the second actually
taking pleasure in acting virtuously, I believe that both are accurately captured by the term
“right feeling.” If one is disposed to act in some way and is able to act in a way consistent
with that disposition, then by definition one does not have a contrary inclination. 13 Suppose
I have a disposition to act beneficently towards my friends and that I am confronted by a
situation in which I am able to act in a beneficent manner towards a friend of mine; a
contrary inclination to act non-beneficently is presumably nowhere to be found, and I will
also likely take pleasure acting in accordance with my disposition, as it were, by acting in
a beneficent way. 14
To frame the issue another way: the earlier passage from Nagel suggested that “to
possess… vices is to be unable to help having certain feelings under certain circumstances”
13
In other words, I believe it would be contradictory to say that an agent can have two concurrent
but contradictory dispositions; while we certainly can have conflicting reasons for action, it does
not seem to be the case that we similarly can have contradictory propensities to act in certain ways.
For example, I might have two different reasons to act beneficently towards a friend – a selfinterested one and an altruistic one, perhaps. However, it does not seem plausible in this case that I
could have both a disposition to act beneficently towards my friends in conjunction with a
disposition to not act beneficently towards my friends. In some sense, then, reasons seem specific
to instances, while dispositions to act in some way are by definition less instance-specific and more
general in nature.
14
While we clearly can have dispositions that we do not take pleasure in acting upon, it seems that
such cases are limited to those dispositions that are already decidedly unvirtuous – because we
recognize them as such. Conversely, I find it plausible that we take a sort of second-order pleasure
in acting in consistency only with our dispositions that are virtuous.
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and that “people are morally condemned for… qualities, and esteemed for other equally
beyond control of the will: they are assessed for what they are like.” From this he
characterizes the Kantian view as saying that “it makes no sense to condemn oneself or
anyone else for a quality which is not within the control of the will.” In these few phrases,
there are a number of claims and assumptions about morality and agency that I believe are
not as obvious as Nagel and Kant take them to be. Specifically, I doubt it really true that
having a vice is simply being “unable to help having certain feelings” and that certain
qualities of character are really “beyond control of the will.” I believe, contra Nagel, that
these things are (to an extent) not beyond control of the will and that further, we are able
to play an active role in what feelings we have when acting – because of our ability to
effect which reasons we are responsive to.
To explain why I think this, we need to return to Audi’s views. I believe they are
accurate yet incomplete in virtue of not adequately addressing the requirement for virtuous
behavior that one act with the right feeling. If my interpretation of Audi’s views is correct,
he only satisfactorily describes the way in which willfully becoming continent – but not
virtuous! – is within our control. He explains how we can get ourselves to be motivated by
the right reasons when doing the right action, but says little to nothing about ridding
ourselves of any contrary inclinations against doing so; he only gestures at the role of
virtuous character in meeting the requirements for virtuous behavior, which as I have
argued is plausibly his attempt at discussing the requisite right feeling I am concerned with.
Thus, I believe Audi has only gotten us two-thirds of the way in justifying the view that
virtue is “up to us” and not a matter of moral luck. To give a complete account of the way
in which it is within our ability to deliberately satisfy the three necessary conditions for
virtuous behavior, one must effectively explain the way in which we can willfully conduct
ourselves so as to have the right feeling(s), the lack of which prevents Aristotle’s continent
individual from becoming a truly virtuous one. I now turn to that task.
4. Desiring Virtue
My current aim is to show that we are capable of willfully conducting ourselves
such that we can have some version and amount of control over our inclinations and
dispositions – including, importantly, those that are contrary to virtue – in order to show
that we are capable of intentionally and deliberately doing not just the right action for the
right reason, but also ensuring we do so with the right feeling requisite for virtuous
behavior.
It has traditionally been held by philosophers discussing virtue that routinely acting
in the right way for the reason is generally sufficient to cause an agent to lose their contrary
inclinations to act otherwise. For example, in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle
discusses what he takes to be the necessary role that habit(uation) plays in the cultivation
and development of virtue. Similarly, Audi briefly mentions that “… as with most kinds of
virtuous actions, regularly acting generously [or in some other virtuous manner] is likely
to lead to developing the trait in question….” 15 These are empirical claims, but I think it is
fair to say that they are likely accurate ones. So, if it is true that regularly acting doing the
15

Id. at 5.
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right action for the right reason will likely lead one to acquire the trait or disposition that
constitutes having some virtue, then it follows that habituation is the means by which one
can ultimately behave in a virtuous manner.
However, Aristotle can be interpreted as simply assuming this to be the case in
regard to our moral psychologies. Audi also appears to be making a similar move in
presuming the legitimacy of this method. And although I agree that habituation is likely
the means by which we develop the dispositions qua virtues of character that allow us to
act without the contrary inclinations of the merely continent person, in the remainder of
this essay I would like to give a more fine-grained analysis of just what this process
involves. Moreover, I want to give such an account whilst keeping in mind that I, along
with Aristotle and Audi, am arguing that virtue is “up to us” in large part. I want to
demonstrate that it is within our power to willfully conduct ourselves in such a way so as
to lose our contrary inclinations against acting virtuously and to consequently take pleasure
in doing so – in other words, to show that we can largely control our dispositions and thus
feelings, and consequently satisfy in a very deliberate manner the last necessary condition
for virtuous behavior by desiring to act as such. Habituation is certainly the crux of not just
cultivating virtuous action and increasing sensitivity to the right sort of reasons, but also
(perhaps most importantly) of ridding ourselves of inclinations. However, I also believe
that there is more to be said about just what occurs during habituation than is discussed by
Aristotle and Audi. I believe that we have the ability to rid ourselves of contrary
inclinations against acting virtuously. But just why do I think we are capable of doing this
in a way above and beyond merely acting habitually 16 in a certain way for certain reasons?
5. The Cultivation of Virtuous Desires
In the remainder of this essay, I will offer a brief sketch outlining the way in which
I believe that transitioning from being merely continent to fully virtuous is something that
is, to an extent, within our power rather than a matter of the moral luck discussed by Nagel
and Kant. Just like we have control over which actions we choose to do and which reasons
we are responsive to, I also take it that we likewise have a modicum of control over how
we feel when doing the right actions for the right reasons. If what I say is correct, then all
of the necessary components for virtuous behavior are at least partially within our ability
to willfully influence and ultimately attain if we are purposely aim at doing so – especially
including the way we feel when acting. In other words, the potential problem Audi initially
raised for virtue theory, which I take him to have only partially dissolved, can be adequately
accounted for. This, in turn, readmits the possibility of virtuous behavior, putting it out of
the skeptic’s reach and back within our own. What follows is a short argument as to why I
think this is the case.
Recall Audi’s view that our understanding of our reasons for action are really just
16
While habituation is a coherent means of actively and willfully cultivating virtue, it does not by
any means guarantee it; Audi himself notes this. For example, it seems entirely possible that one
could grow to dislike acting in a certain way the more one does it, and that the strength of one’s
contrary inclination(s) will increase accordingly. I want to argue, therefore, that there are steps we
can deliberately take that reduce the likelihood of this decidedly unvirtuous possibility.
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constituted by our beliefs about the strength of the grounds that support performing some
action. From this, he argues that via being able to influence our beliefs, we can likewise
influence our responsiveness to certain reasons, namely the right or appropriate ones that
are consistent with acting virtuously. In this way, we have indirect control over what
reasons we ultimately take to be motivating. We cannot at will choose to act on a reason,
even if we know it is the one that we ought to be acting on; however, there are certain
epistemic procedures we can routinely practice so as to make ourselves more responsive to
the reasons that we really ought to be acting on.
So, per Audi let us grant that we can influence both which reasons we are
responsive to and, because of that fact, what we believe. Broadly speaking, like Aristotle’s
continent individual we can presumably use our “rational principle” to see what action(s)
virtue requires of us, as well as what the virtuous reason for doing said action is. By
understanding those facts and then fulfilling some or all of Audi’s five domains of moral
responsibility qua epistemic practices, we can make the right reason(s) actually motivating
to or for us. But again, what about how we feel when acting in accordance with virtue by
doing the right actions for the right reasons(s)? If we act whilst still feeling a contrary
“appetite,” or inclination, then we are merely continent and not truly virtuous. If Audi’s
account is correct, we can see what the good, right, and appropriate reasons for action are
and make ourselves more sensitive to and motivated by those reasons that are consistent
with virtue. However, his views, while accurate as they stand, are incomplete because they
only demonstrate the possibility of willful continence, and not willful virtue.
Building on Audi’s analysis, though, I believe that it follows from his discussion
of our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness that the right feeling requisite for
behavior to meet the criteria for being virtuous is something that we can willfully cultivate,
because of the relationship between reasons, beliefs, and desires.
My central point is that, similarly to the way in which we can apparently influence
our receptivity to reasons for belief and action, we can therefore: see what we have reason
to desire, including and especially per the dictates of virtue; make ourselves more
responsive to and motivated by those reasons; instill within ourselves those appropriate,
virtuous desires; and then, ultimately act in accordance with those desires whilst lacking
any contrary inclination(s) and thus presumably taking pleasure in doing so. In other words,
it seems that via our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness, we can plausibly
influence our responsiveness to the reasons supporting not just we have reason to do or
believe but also what we have reason to desire. And if we desire to act in some way for
some reason, and then actually do act in said way for said reason, we necessarily do so
without a contrary inclination (because we desire to act in this way rather than another) and
presumably take pleasure (broadly speaking, desire-satisfaction results in some sort of
pleasure) in doing so – making the behavior virtuous rather than merely continent.
Per Audi our comprehension of our reasons for action is constituted by beliefs
regarding the grounds supporting doing some action, and because we have the ability to
influence what we believe, we can thus influence our proclivity to be motivated by the right
reasons – not just those supporting certain beliefs and actions, but also desires. Further, I
take there to be a parallel between beliefs and desires in the sense that they are both
intentional states – we believe something, just as we desire something. In this way, if
something is true about beliefs, then in a general sense it is prima facie plausible to think
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that that same thing holds regarding desires as well. And, one thing that seems true about
our beliefs is that they are informed by reasons; we often believe what we believe on the
basis of the strength of the grounds qua reasons in support of believing that thing. Likewise,
I want to argue as intentional states akin to beliefs, desires are in some sense similarly
influenced by reason(s). Of course, this prompts the question: are desires directly informed
by reason(s), or are desires informed by beliefs which are themselves informed by
reason(s)? This can be respectively formulated in two different ways: one, with desires
being directly informed by reasons alone, without any mediating beliefs in between; or
two, with desires being influenced by beliefs and then with desire-informing-beliefs
themselves informed by reasons. For my purposes, I will leave this as an open question.
My main claim is that our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness realistically
entails that we can influence our desires; because reasons and our sensitivity to them play
an essential role in each interpretation, I take it to be one of the upshots of my argument
that it can accommodate both of the above formulations about the relation between reasons,
beliefs, and desires.
To summarize, my primary assertion is this: we have the ability to influence our
reasons-responsiveness such that we can willfully be more sensitive to those reasons that
are consistent with virtue, and because of this ability we can deliberately influence our
sensitivity to reasons regarding what we have reason to desire, and thus willfully guide our
desires themselves (to an extent). In turn, by being able to cultivate within ourselves the
desire to act in consistency with virtue and in conjunction with then doing the right actions
for the right reasons, we will likely take pleasure in doing so, without any contrary
inclinations, ultimately making us fully virtuous rather than merely continent in a way that,
above and beyond the deliverances of moral luck, is actually “up to us.” And while only a
preliminary outline, I believe that my view as presented is a plausible one on its face. In
that spirit, I now turn to and will spend the remainder of this essay responding to two
preliminary objections.
6. Humean Motivation and Belief-Desire Bootstrapping
Thus far, I have proposed that we can actively cultivate the appropriate virtuous
desires that would allow us to satisfy the third and last necessary condition for virtuous
behavior: taking pleasure in acting virtuously, without a contrary inclination against doing
so, because we have a desire to act virtuously – or, acting with the right feeling. I have
argued that this is because, per Audi’s arguments, it seems that even if we cannot willfully
choose what reasons we act on, we can influence and increase our responsiveness to the
right reasons, which will then, in turn, cause us to have the appropriate beliefs and desires
that are requisite for both being motivated by the right reason(s) and for carrying out the
action with the right feeling. In this way, the satisfaction of all three necessary conditions
for virtue – including and especially the last one – are within our power, to a degree, to
actively, willfully, and deliberately cultivate.
However, there are two objections that come to mind when considering my
proposal that our desires and thus the capacity to take pleasure in acting virtuously is
something that is within our control. The first comes from a set of views regarding the
relationship between reason, desire, and motivation, taking after Hume’s belief that “reason
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is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” and arguing that any account – including
mine – that claims reason can in some way motivate behavior is mistaken from the outset;
rather, only desires can be motivating, and reason both cannot and should not have any
prominent role in explaining motivation. The second objection says that just as seeing what
we have reason to do is often not enough to actually motivate us to act in that way and/or
on the basis of that reason, merely seeing what we have reason to desire is not sufficient,
on its own, to actually cause us to have to have that desire.
The first objection to my proposal, then, arises out of the Humean view regarding
motivation. 17 I will only briefly describe the view, as my aim is not to refute it but rather
show how my proposal is entirely consistent with its picture of the relationship between
reason, desire, and motivation. Briefly put, and substituting Hume’s “passions” for desires,
the Humean picture is as follows: regarding our practical, means-end reasoning about how
to act, desires are the only thing able to produce ends, while reason, on the other hand, can
only produce beliefs. Because of this, desires are the only sort of thing that can be and
actually are motivating; reason on its own is insufficient to “generate… [the] impulse” 18
necessary for action. A key part of my proposal is that we both can and should use reason,
via influencing our reasons-responsiveness, to cause ourselves to carry out the right action
on the basis of the right reason and with the right feeling, the latter of which I argued arises
from having the right desires. Such a proposal, then, is clearly at odds with Hume’s claim
that our rationality and actions are beholden to our desires.
I believe, however, that my proposal is entirely consistent with the Humean view
of motivation, and that this is true regardless of whether or not that view is in fact true.
Recall that I am arguing that because of our ability to play an active part in influencing our
reasons-responsiveness and thus belief formation, we can make therefore make ourselves
see what we have reason to desire and actually take those reasons to be compelling, which
conceivably eventually instills those desires within us. Hume’s view is that only desires
can be motivating, but it is compatible with such an outlook that our reasons can and do
inform our desires, as I am claiming. In other words, for Hume using reason to arrive at a
belief regarding what ends we ought to have is insufficient; we also need to actually desire
that end in order to be motivated to act in such a way as to attain it. Yet, we often use reason
to deliberate about what we ought to desire, and it is consequently entirely plausible that
reasoning about what we ought to desire actually informs what desires we ultimately end
up possessing. My proposal is that we can make ourselves responsive to the appropriate
reasons in support of beliefs about what we ought to desire, with the underlying implication
that we ought to desire to act virtuously. 19 That is, we do the epistemic practices that make
us sensitive to the best reasons; we become sensitive to those reasons, which support having
some beliefs about what we ought to desire; we then end up with the belief about what we
17

I rely on Amy Schmitter’s interpretation of Hume here. Schmitter, Amy M., "17th and 18th
Century Theories of Emotions." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2016 Edition,
ed. Edward N. Zalta.
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Id.
That is, I am referencing the widely-held view that the dictates of morality and virtue are in some
sense reason-granting. While accounts as to the source of that granting of reasons for action and
belief differ, the stance itself is widely held as a constituent feature of moral discourse.
19
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ought to desire; and because we are actually compelled by those reasons, the belief about
what we ought to desire often results in our actually having that desire. 20 And because we
now actually have the desire to act virtuously, we satisfy the Humean condition requisite
for actually motivating us to act in that manner. Just as Hume thinks it is impossible to
even use rationality itself without the prior desire to do so, I hold that it is likewise
incoherent to think that reason plays no part in informing or creating our desires. 21 If the
Humean view of motivation is true, my proposal can accommodate it; if it is false, then so
much the better for me.
The second objection turns out to be closely related to the first, and I have already
partially addressed it. It holds that merely seeing what we have reason to desire – in other
words, having a belief about what we ought to desire – is insufficient on its own to actually
cause us to have the desire in question. This certainly occurs; we often have beliefs about
what we ought to desire but fail to have the corresponding desire itself. I believe, though,
that this is more unlikely and implausible when it comes to matters concerning morality
and virtue. By definition, ethics deals with agency and normativity – specifically regarding
what we ought to do, but as I have discussed there is a close relationship in virtue theory
between what we ought to do and what beliefs and desires we ought to have. Generally
speaking, I take there to be a common awareness qua belief that morality involves reasongiving imperatives, and that therefore most people have some sort of a set of beliefs and
desires regarding what we ought to do – maybe just a belief that there are some things we
ought to do, and just a desire to do the things that we ought to do. Assuming the truth of
the objection, it is still plausible that we can bootstrap up, as it were, from those
aforementioned initial desires and beliefs to arrive at the higher-order beliefs and desires
necessary for virtue, by using our agential reason-responsiveness-influencing capacities (a
la Audi) to create these “new” beliefs and desires. In this way, it is not as if the beliefs and
desires essential for virtue need to be spontaneously generated; rather, they can be
grounded in broad, general beliefs and desires that we all already have merely in virtue of
being agents with agency participating in moral practice and discourse. And this is
20

This, of course, is the controversial part of my thesis. I admit that there is likely no necessary
connection here; there do seem to be cases where we have a belief about what ought to desire without
actually having the corresponding desire. I do believe, however, that my thesis does generally hold
in the context of morality generally and specifically virtue. Presumably, if one arrives at the belief
that one ought to desire to act virtuously, then the aforementioned sort of disjunction will not occur.
If one is not just aware that it is commonly held that that one ought to desire to act virtuously but
actually believes that they ought to desire to act virtuously, then I take it to be fair to say that one
will then actually have that desire. The key elements here are actually having the belief, and the
parallel that I take there to be between beliefs regarding acting in some way and beliefs regarding
desiring something; if I have a belief about what I ought to have a belief about, then I almost
assuredly actually end up having that latter belief – it makes no sense to say that I would not.
Similarly, if I have a belief about what I ought to desire (namely, acting virtuously), it seems likely
that I will actually end up with that desire.
21
While clearly some, perhaps many, of our desires are a-rational or irrational, it is similarly clear
that many of our desires arise as the result of rational deliberation and/or on the basis of reasons. I
desire to write and complete this essay because there are many reasons in support of why I ought to
desire to do so: to get a good grade in my seminar, to think carefully about an interesting
philosophical topic, to have a potential writing sample for doctoral applications, and so on.
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precisely what I think is implicitly occurring in both Audi and Hume’s accounts, as for
morality to even get off the ground, as it were, we have to have certain beliefs and desires,
as well as the means to rationally navigate them during practical deliberation whilst aiming
at behaving virtuously.
7. Conclusion: Is Virtue Up to Us?
In this paper, I wish to have accomplished a number of things. Mainly, I hope to
have convincingly demonstrated that taking pleasure in virtuous action by desiring to act
virtuously is something that we can deliberately and willfully cultivate, which would mean
that virtuous behavior is “up to us,” to an extent, and not purely a matter of moral luck. I
gave an account of what virtuous behavior is and what it requires: right action, done for
the right reason, and done with the right feeling. Drawing on Audi’s work, I showed that
the first two of these three elements is indirectly within our power to ensure. I then argued
that in the same way we can make ourselves responsive to virtuous reasons for action, we
can similarly make ourselves more responsive to reasons regarding what we ought to desire
– namely, to act virtuously. In this way, I concluded that we can conceivably cause
ourselves to have the desires necessary for one to take pleasure in virtuous action, without
a contrary inclination to do otherwise that prevents the continent person from being a
virtuous one. And, I think this is true due to the nature of morality and agency itself, and
regardless of the outcome of debates surrounding motivation and desires.
Briefly put, I have argued that the actions, reasons for action, and now desires
requisite for virtuous behavior are not merely a matter of moral luck and are rather, in large
part, under our control, if we choose to put in the effort – and of course, we ought to. This
leads to an affirmative answer to the question posed in the title of this section: virtue is, in
fact, largely up to us.
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